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Thus, whether or no a bona fide dispute exists is a question of law
for the courts.62
Jurisdiction of the court to determine whether a dispute is
frivolous or not is not provided for in section 1449 of the Civil
Practice Act. The language of the arbitration clause in the in-
stant case would seem broad enough to include such issues.
Interpretation
In Moeller v. Associated Hospital Serve 3 the plaintiff
sought to recover for hospital expenses under a "Blue Cross" hos-
pital insurance policy issued by the defendant. The policy ex-
pressly excluded for coverage hospital service "provide- for
under any compensation law . .." The plaintiff had been in-
jured in the course of employment, and his hospital bills were
paid by his employer's compensation carrier. Thereafter, the
plaintiff began suit against the third party tort-feasor which re-
sulted in a settlement. The compensation carrier enforced its
lien upon the settlement for the amount paid upon plaintiff's com-
pensation claim.
64
The present action was submitted to the Appellate Division
upon an agreed statement of facts. The plaintiff contends that his
hospital expenses were not within the meaning of the exclusion
clause of the policy. The Appellate Division allowed recovery
upon the ground that when the compensation carrier was reim-
bursed, it no longer provided hospital service under the compen-
sation statutes, since by reimbursement the services were actually
"provided" by someone else.6 5 The Court of Appeals, three
judges dissenting, found that the hospital services were provided
for by the Workumen's Compensation Law since the "plaintiff
never lost the protection of the Statute with respect to hospital
services." ' , The majority also found that any other construction
62. Matter of General Elec. Co. (United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers), 300 N. Y.
262, 90 N. E. 2d 181 (1949).
63. 304 N. Y. 73, 106 N. E. 2d 16 (1952).
64. N. Y. WoRxmEN'S Co-mP. LAW §29 (1). This section gives the carrier a
hen on the proceeds of any settlement to the extent of the amount of compensation
provided and goes on to state that any recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of the
carrier.
65. 278 App. Div. 723, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (3rd Dep't 1951).
66. The court stated: "If he did not prevail in the third-party action, he neverthe-
less retained the benefits of the hospital expenses furnished by the employer's insurance
carrier; if he did prevail, he likewise retained these benefits, but the third-party wrong-
doer, not plaintiff, had to reimburse the carrier. While plaintiff was entitled to sue
for these expenses, it was on behalf of the carrier, and the law gave the carrier a lien
therefor. He could never recover these medical expenses for himself; they belonged
under the statute to the carrier." 304 N. Y. at 75, 106 N. E. 2d at 17.
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would be unnatural and could- only lead to increased premiums
for policy holders. The dissent found that the hospital services
were actually provided for ulti62ately by the common law of neg-
ligence and not by the Workmen's Compensation Statute, and that
the clear meaning of the exclusion clause showed that the intent of
the parties was to relieve the insurer from liability only when the
Compensation Law was the ultimate source of liability. The
dissent was also of the opinion that the majority had ignored the
rule that uncertain words in an insurance policy are to be con-
strued most strongly against the insurer.
A recent Michigan case has reached a similar result where the
policy excluded from coverage persons to whom "benefits are pay-
able' under any workmen's compensation law.67
V. CR.TINAL LAw
During the course of its last session, the Court was confronted
with various appeals in the field of criminal law, which ran the
gamut from jurisdiction over the subiect matter to the post-trial
relief of writ of error coron nobis. Several of the decisions ren-
dered are noteworthy for their clarifying effect on certain obscure
areas of the criminal law, while others are important because they
serve to establish a new and positive stand by the Court on ques-
tions previously considered well settled. Unfortunately, however,
the Court, in some of its decisions, has succeeded in settling the
appeals without deciding in any helpful manner the issues which
the appeals had framed.
Venue
The case of Murtagh v. Leibouqtz' occupies a high position
in the field of clarifyinz decisions. Under the common law it was
required, in general, that all offense-, should be inquired into, as
well as tried, in the county in which they were committed.
2  A
defect developed, in that if the alleged act was committed partly
in one county and partly in another, neither county had jurisdic-
tion.8 The legislature has now provided, however, by §134 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure that "When a crime is committed
partly in one county and partly in another, or the acts or effects
67. Bonney v. Citized's Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 333 Mich. 436, 53 N. W. 2d 321 (1952).
1. 303 N. Y. 311, 101 N. E. 2d 753 (1951).
2. People v. Mitchell, 168 N. Y. 604, 61 N. E. 182 (1901).
3. See People v. Vario, 165 Misc. 842, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 611 (Co. Ct. 1938).
